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Abstract
Costly information acquisition is introduced into a dynamic trading model of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). The market maker and some traders, called “value traders,”
value the asset at its fundamental value, which can be either high or low. The remain-
ing traders, called “liquidity traders,” have idiosyncratic valuations that are indepen-
dent of the fundamental. At a cost, each value trader can acquire an informative, but
imperfect, signal about the fundamental. In this setting, at equilibrium, each value
trader acquires the signal if and only if the uncertainty about the fundamental’s value
conditional on publicly available information is sufficiently high. Thus, the prices
quoted by the market maker are “informationally inefficient,” as they do not reveal
the value of the fundamental, even in the long-run. Equilibrium amount of informa-
tion acquisition is either excessive or insufficient relative to the social optimum and
results in an inefficient allocation of the asset among the market maker and liquidity
traders.
JEL Classification: D80, D83, D84, G12, G14
Keywords: Sequential Trading, Cost of Information, Endogenous Information Ac-
quisition.
∗I am grateful to Robert Evans, Edward Green, Romans Pancs, Hamid Sabourian, Jonathan Thomas,
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1 Introduction
This paper studies costly information acquisition in a version of sequential trading model
first introduced by Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The aim of the paper is twofold: to char-
acterize market outcomes and to undertake welfare analysis of these outcomes.
The model considers a market for a single risky asset with a binary liquidation value. It is
assumed that all trades are mediated by a competitive market maker who sets the prices
on the basis of the order flow. Traders arrive sequentially to the market in some pre-
specified random order. There is a fixed proportion of value traders who, prior to trading,
have a choice of whether or not to obtain a costly signal. The remaining traders are liquid-
ity traders who are price sensitive and do not care about the fundamental. As the name
suggests, these traders trade for liquidity reasons and thus value the asset differently from
the market maker and the value traders.
It is demonstrated that, in the presence of fixed costs to information acquisition, some
valuable information never reaches the market and hence prices cannot be fully informa-
tionally efficient, i.e. prices cannot converge to the liquidation value of the underlying
asset. This outcome echoes the idea of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) that there must be
some equilibrium level of inefficiency in the market or otherwise equilibrium may fail to
exist. In particular, in equilibrium, information must generate returns just sufficient to
compensate for the costs associated with the gathering of this information. Similar infor-
mational inefficiency occurs in the sequential trading model considered here through the
following mechanism. With fixed costs to information acquisition, value traders find it
optimal to stop obtaining signals when the asset price is sufficiently close to one of the ex-
tremes and the benefit of a signal is outweighed by its costs. Thus there are two threshold
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values of the public belief about the likely asset value at which signal acquisition stops.
As soon as the public belief reaches one of these thresholds, trades become uninformative
and the market maker stops updating the price. As a result, the price gets trapped at a
given level that may or may not be close to the liquidation value of the asset.
In the proposed model, informational inefficiency of prices has significant welfare impli-
cations. Because liquidity traders have idiosyncratic valuations, while other market par-
ticipants value the asset at the fundamental, the efficient allocation of the asset depends
on its liquidation value. Hence, information about the fundamental is socially valuable.
However, value traders, when they decide whether to acquire informative signals, do not
take into account the positive externality their decisions exert on the payoff of liquidity
traders. This suggests that in the long-run, market solution may underprovide informa-
tion relative to a social optimum.
For the purposes of welfare analysis, the paper introduces a utilitarian social planner who
does not have access to the private information of traders but can influence their informa-
tion acquisition efforts. Numerical simulations indicate that the optimal signal acquisition
policy of the social planner differs qualitatively from the information acquisition strategy
in the market equilibrium. The social planner either induces signal acquisition with prob-
ability 1 or prohibits it. At the market equilibrium, however, information acquisition does
not stop abruptly. Instead, as the public belief regarding the asset value moves closer to
the extreme values of 0 or 1, the equilibrium probability with which value traders acquire
signals decreases gradually.
Welfare analysis confirms the intuition that, in the long-run, the decentralised market so-
lution underprovides information relative to the social optimum, provided the social plan-
ner is sufficiently patient. At the same time, signal acquisition efforts induce a positive
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bid-ask spread, which precludes some liquidity traders from placing orders and reduces
social welfare in the short-run. Consequently, if the social planner is impatient, market
overprovides information relative to the social optimum.
The paper is related to rational herding applied to financial markets.1 The literature has
found that, in financial markets, accumulation of information stops in the presence of
some frictions such as transaction costs as in Lee (1993) and Romano (2007), the opportu-
nity cost of investment coupled with endogenous timing as in Chari and Kehoe (2004), or
career considerations as in Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008). Cipriani and Guarino (2001)
show that, in the long-run, trades also stop conveying private information in a sequen-
tial trading model with heterogeneous agents who differ in the utilities they derive from
holding the asset.
The existing literature typically assumes that private signals are costless. The case of costly
information acquisition has received surprisingly little attention. Kubler and Weizsacker
(2004) present a laboratory experiment that incorporates fixed costs to signal acquisition
in a canonical social learning model. In the equilibrium of this game, only the first player
acquires the signal while all the other players do not buy the signal and emulate the be-
haviour of the first player.
Burguet and Vives (2000) consider costly information acquisition in the context of smooth
and noisy versions of a canonical social learning model, where agents sequentially attempt
to predict a normally distributed random variable. In their model, there is no market and,
like in the early social learning models of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch (1992), the cost of taking an action is fixed.
This paper assigns a well-specified utility function to noise traders, which allows analysing
1See, for example, Avery and Zemsky (1998) or Park and Sabourian (2009).
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welfare implications of market outcome. Welfare analysis is another aspect that sets this
paper apart from the rest of the literature dealing with rational herding in financial mar-
kets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes the market equilibrium and shows that, when information is costly,
prices cannot be fully informationally efficient. Section 4 analyses welfare implications of
equilibrium behaviour. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Setup
The model is extends a special case of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) sequential trading
model by allowing some traders to acquire information about the asset’s liquidation value
Assume that there is a single risky asset with liquidation value V ∈ {0, 1}. The prior
probability of the high asset value is p1 ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., P (V = 1) = p1). Trading takes place
in discrete time, and risk neutral traders arrive each period in a pre-specified, exogenous
order. Thus, at each date t = 1, 2, ... a trader is chosen from an infinite pool of risk neutral
agents. Upon arrival, the trader can either remain inactive or decide to buy or sell one
unit of the asset. Let at ∈ {buy, sell, hold} be the action of the trader arriving at t. Assume
that each agent can act only once and that he leaves the market immediately afterwards.
Ex ante, none of the traders possesses superior information. However, a proportion µ,
where µ ≤ 1/2, of traders are value traders, each of whom, before taking action at, can
decide whether to acquire a symmetric binary signal S ∈ {0, 1} with precision q ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
,
meaning that P (S = 1 | V = 1) = P (S = 0 | V = 0) = q. The cost of this signal is c,
5
0 < c ≤ 1.2
The remaining fraction 1− µ of traders are liquidity traders, who cannot (and do not wish
to) acquire a signal. Each liquidity trader values the asset at u, which is privately observed
and is distributed uniformly on [0, 1].
Prices are set by a risk neutral market maker who, in each t, posts a bid price Bt at which
he is willing to buy the asset and an ask price At at which he is willing to sell. As is
standard in the literature (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), it is assumed that the market
maker is subject to unmodeled Bertrand competition. Consequently, in equilibrium, the
market maker sets the lowest ask and the highest bid price so as to break even on every
trade.
When the value of the asset is v, the payoff of a value trader entering the market in period
t is:
pi I (at, At, Bt; v) =

v− At − cI {acquire} if at = buy
0 if at = hold
Bt − v− cI {acquire} if at = sell
,
where I {acquire} is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 if a signal is acquired
and 0 otherwise. The payoff of a liquidity trader with valuation u entering the market in
2The parameter space of interest is 0 < c ≤ 1, as if the signal is too costly (i.e., c > 1), no value trader
would ever find it worthwhile to acquire it. At the other extreme, if c = 0, the model reduces to the one
considered by Avery and Zemsky (1998), Park and Sabourian (2009).
The restriction on µ ensures that if all value traders were endowed with a perfectly informative signal,
the bid-ask spread would be less than one almost everywhere and the market would never break down.
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period t is:
piL (at, At, Bt; v) =

u− At if at = buy
0 if at = hold
Bt − u if at = sell
.
The market maker values the asset at V. He has no private information and can condition
prices solely on publicly available information Ht and on the current period’s order. The
publicly available information Ht contains solely the sequence of past traders’ actions aτ
and the realized transaction prices pτ, i.e., Ht = {aτ, pτ}t−1τ=1 ∈ Ht, where H1 is a null
history and Ht denotes the set of all t-period-long public histories. Whether the agent is
a value trader or a liquidity trader, as well as whether he has acquired a signal, and the
realization of that signal constitute his private information.
Equilibrium Concept
The model constitutes a sequential game of incomplete information. In this game, the rel-
evant solution concept is the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which must specify a strategy
for each trader and a system of beliefs such that each strategy is optimal for the trader at
every history given his beliefs, and these beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategy
profile by Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Due to the presence of liquidity traders, any his-
tory Ht occurs with a strictly positive probability, and there are no observable deviations.
Hence, in each period, each player’s belief regarding the value of the underlying asset, as
well as the market maker’s belief regarding the type of the trader he faces are uniquely
determined by Bayes’ rule. In order to solve for an equilibrium, it remains to specify the
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market maker’s belief regarding the signal acquisition strategy, equilibrium bid and ask
prices after every history, the decision of each value trader whether to buy a signal, as
well as the orders that information and liquidity traders place.
It is assumed that, when a trader is indifferent between placing a trading order and play-
ing hold, he trades. This tie-breaking convention makes the notation and the analysis
simpler but has no bearing on the main results. Also, the behaviour of a trader when he
is indifferent between all actions in his action space {buy, sell, hold} has no impact on the
results, and thus, in this case, the trading decision can be specified in an arbitrary manner.
3 Equilibrium Market Outcomes
3.1 The Equilibrium Characterisation
Once a signal is acquired, its cost is sunk and does not affect the trading decision of a value
trader. Hence, the optimal trading decision for a value trader who observes signal S is to
place a buy order if the expected value of the asset conditional on S weakly exceeds the
current ask price, i.e., E [V | S, Ht] ≥ At. The value trader prefers to sell if his conditional
expectation of the asset value lies below the bid price, i.e., E [V | S, Ht] ≤ Bt. The trader
optimally refrains from trading if Bt < E [V | S, Ht] < At.
Let pt denote the public belief which, in the case of the asset taking values in {0, 1}, is equal
to the expected value of the asset given the history of trades Ht, pt := P [V = 1 | Ht] =
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E [V | Ht] . Then, the expected value of the asset given the high signal is:
E [V | S = 1, Ht] = P [V = 1 | S = 1, Ht]
=
qpt
qpt + (1− q) (1− pt) ≥ pt, (1)
while the expected value given the low signal is:
E [V | S = 0, Ht] = P [V = 1 | S = 0, Ht]
=
(1− q) pt
(1− q) pt + q (1− pt) ≤ pt, (2)
where all conditional probabilities are obtained by Bayes’ rule.
Upon acquiring a signal, value traders are always active in the market, i.e., depending
on the value of the observed signal, a value trader entering the market in period t places
either a buy or a sell order with a strictly positive probability. This is because, if in some
t informed value traders were playing hold with probability 1, the market maker would
break even by setting prices At = Bt = pt. However, at such prices an informed trader
with a high signal finds it optimal to buy, while an informed trader with a low signal finds
it optimal to sell.
Since the market maker is assumed to break even on every trade, the ask price is the ex-
pected value of the asset conditional on history Ht and a buy order, i.e., At = E [V | at = buy at At, Ht].
Since informed value traders are always active in the market, E [V | at = buy at At, Ht]
can be written as a convex combination of two terms, a liquidity trader’s assessment of
the asset value pt and an informed buyer’s assessment. Similarly, the bid price Bt =
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E [V | at = sell at Bt, Ht] is a weighted average of a liquidity trader’s assessment of the
asset value pt and an informed seller’s assessment. It remains to identify how the value
of the signal affects the direction of the trade.
By assumption, signals are informative (i.e., q > 12 ). Hence, any trader who has observed a
signal is better informed than the market maker, and the market maker makes an expected
loss on a trade with this trader. Therefore, in equilibrium, the market maker sets bid and
ask prices so that the expected profits on trades with liquidity traders are just sufficient
to compensate for the expected losses on trades with informed payoff maximisers. Con-
sequently, at each t, prices are such that At ≥ E [V | Ht] ≥ Bt, i.e., there is a bid-and-ask
spread At − Bt ≥ 0. The next lemma formalises this intuition. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, At ≥ pt ≥ Bt.
The bid-ask spread coupled the facts that informed traders always trade and thatE [V | S = 1, Ht] ≥
pt ≥ E [V | S = 0, Ht] imply that each informed trader prefers to buy after observing S = 1
and prefers to sell after observing S = 0 in every period.
As long as there is a strictly positive bid-ask spread (i.e., At > Bt), an uninformed value
trader holds. This is because an uninformed trader’s belief regarding the asset value co-
incides with the public belief pt and thus, when At > pt > Bt, placing either a buy or a
sell order involves a loss in expected terms.3
Given that in equilibrium, At ≥ Bt, the optimal trading strategy of a liquidity trader with
valuation u is to buy if u ≥ At, sell if u ≤ Bt and hold if At < u < Bt.
3When there is no bid and ask spread, i.e., At = Bt, trades do not have any informational content and
the behaviour of uninformed traders has no influence on the market maker’s belief. Hence, in this case, the
behaviour of an uninformed trader can be specified in an arbitrary manner.
10
To solve for an equilibrium, it remains to characterise the optimal signal acquisition de-
cision. Each value trader bases his decision of whether to acquire additional information
on the expected payoff from signal acquisition, which is equal to the expected benefit of a
signal minus its cost. While the cost of a signal is fixed at c, the expected benefit depends
on the current public belief pt and the current bid and ask prices. These prices, in turn,
depend of the market maker’s belief regarding the information acquisition decisions of
value traders. In equilibrium, the market maker must have the correct belief and value
traders must behave optimally given this belief.
Suppose that the market maker believes that value traders acquire information with prob-
ability σ˜.4 Then, the competitive market maker posts the lowest ask price and the highest
bid prices satisfying the following two equations:
At (σ˜) = E [V | at = buy at At (σ˜) , Ht]
=
σ˜qµ+ (1− At (σ˜)) (1− µ)
σ˜µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) + (1− At (σ˜)) (1− µ) pt (3)
and
Bt (σ˜) = E [V | at = sell at Bt (σ˜) , Ht]
=
σ˜ (1− q) µ+ Bt (σ˜) (1− µ)
σ˜µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt)) + Bt (σ˜) (1− µ) pt. (4)
Let Π (pt, σ˜) be the expected payoff from signal acquisition when the current public belief
is pt and the market maker believes that value traders acquire information with probabil-
ity σ˜. If a trader buys a signal and the signal turns out to be high, i.e., S = 1, that trader’s
4In the notation, tilde denotes an arbitrary, not necessarily equilibrium belief of the market maker.
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expected payoff isE [V | S = 1, pt]− At (σ˜)− c.5 However, if the acquired signal turns out
to be low, his expected payoff is Bt (σ˜)−E [V | S = 0, pt]− c. Thus, the overall expected
payoff from signal acquisition is given by:
Π (pt, σ˜) = P [S = 1 | pt] (E [V | S = 1, pt]− At (σ˜)− c)
+P [S = 0 | pt] (Bt (σ˜)−E [V | S = 0, pt]− c) . (5)
If Π (pt, σ˜) is positive, a value trader entering the market in period t finds it optimal to
acquire the signal with probability 1. If Π (pt, σ˜) is negative, the value traders finds it
optimal not to acquire the signal. Finally, if Π (pt, σ˜) = 0, the value trader optimally
acquires the signal with probability σt ∈ [0, 1] .
For any given σ˜, the expected payoff from signal acquisition varies with the current pub-
lic belief regarding the value of the asset, pt. When the public belief pt is either 1 or 0,
P [V = 1 | S = 1, pt] = P [V = 1 | S = 0, pt] = pt and no signal can affect the belief of the
informed trader. Thus, at the extreme values of pt, there is no benefit to acquiring a signal.
However, away from the extremes, the market maker revises his belief in response to a
buy (sell) order less than the informed trader revises his belief in response to signal S = 1
(S = 0). Thus, a signal enables a value trader to trade with the market maker at a profit.
This suggests that Π (pt, σ˜) could be positive when there is sufficient uncertainty regard-
ing the asset’s value and pt is sufficiently close to 1/2. The next lemma and its corollary
confirm this intuition.
5Strictly speaking, expectations should be taken conditioning on the history Ht and not on the public
belief pt. However, to interpret Ht, a trader needs to know the sequence of the past market maker’s beliefs
regarding the signal acquisition strategy of value traders, {σ˜τ}t−1τ=1 . In equilibrium, there is no ambiguity
regarding the correct interpretation of Ht, as the belief of the market maker coincides with the strategy of
value traders. Thus, in equilibrium, history Ht can be summarised by pt.
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Lemma 2. For any q there exists µ¯ (q) such that for any µ < µ¯ (q) and any σ˜, Π (pt, σ˜) is
increasing in pt for pt ≤ 1/2 and is decreasing in pt for pt ≥ 1/2.
For a given belief of the market maker σ˜, the profit from signal acquisition is single peaked
if there is sufficient amount of noise in the market (see Figure 1a). Thus, if each signal is
highly informative (i.e., q is high), the proportion (µ) of value traders must be relatively
low.6
Suppose that, contrary to the lemma’s hypothesis, there are too few liquidity traders in
the market (i.e., µ ≥ µ¯ (q)). In this case, when there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the
asset value (i.e., pt is close to 1/2) and the market maker believes that value traders acquire
some information, the market marker responds aggressively to each trade, suspecting any
trade to be an informed trade. Consequently, when pt is close to 1/2, the bid-ask spread is
high and the profit from being informed is small. However, as the public belief regarding
the asset value moves closer to 0 or 1, the market maker reacts less aggressively to the
information contained in each trade. Consequently, as pt moves towards the extremes, the
bid-ask spread narrows and, as it narrows, more liquidity traders start placing the orders,
which justifies further narrowing of the spread. As a result of this reinforced narrowing
of the spread, acquiring the signal when pt is below or above 1/2 (but not at 0 or 1) may
be more profitable than acquiring the signal when pt = 1/2. Figure 1 confirms that, when
signals are very informative (i.e., q is close to 1) and there are relatively few liquidity
6In a model with exogenous information and perfectly informed value traders, the bid-ask spread is less
than one almost everywhere if µ ≤ 1/2. Lemma 2 imposes a more stringent restriction on µ, as:
d2Π
dp2t
| p = 1/2
µ = 1/2
= −
(2q− 1)
(
3
√
2− 5√2q + 8√1− qq))
2
√
1− q ,
which is negative if and only if q < 0.91. Thus, if signals are very informative (i.e., q is close to 1), restriction
µ ≤ 1/2 may not be enough to guarantee that Π (pt, σ˜) is single peaked with a global maximum at pt = 0.5.
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(a) When q = 0.75, Π (p, σ˜) has a unique global
maximum at p = 1/2 for any σ˜.
(b) When q = 1, Π (p, σ˜) does not necessarily
reach global maximum at p = 1/2.
Figure 1: Π (p, σ˜) , a value trader’s expected payoff from acquiring information when the
public belief is pt and the market maker believes that value traders acquire information
with probability σ˜. The solid blue line corresponds to σ˜ = 1, the dashed purple line
corresponds to σ˜ = 0.85 and the dot-dashed red line corresponds to σ˜ = 0.6. The figure
assumes that µ = .49 and c = 0.1.
traders (i.e., µ is close to 1/2), the profit from signal acquisition may obtain maximum
away from pt = 1/2.
In the remainder of the paper it will be assumed that the parameters of the game satisfy
µ < µ¯ (q) . However, Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 continue to hold even if µ ≥ µ¯ (q). The
qualitative changes to the equilibrium characterization in the case of µ ≥ µ¯ (q) will be
discussed briefly towards the end of the section.
The immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that for every belief of the market maker σ˜,
signal acquisition can be profitable if and only if the public belief pt is sufficiently close to
1/2.
Corollary 1. Fix q. If µ < µ¯ (q) and 0 < c < 12 (2q− 1) , then there exists σ¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that
Π (pt, σ˜) ≥ 0 if and only if σ˜ ≤ σ¯ and pt ∈
[
p (σ˜) , p¯ (σ˜)
]
, where p¯ (σ˜) ≥ 1/2 ≥ p (σ˜) .
Lemma 1 requires that the cost of signal acquisition be not too large. The restriction on the
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maximal size of c ensures that, when pt = 1/2, the expected payoff from signal acquisi-
tion is strictly positive when the market maker holds the most optimistic (from the value
trader’s perspective) belief regarding the signal acquisition strategy, i.e., σ˜ = 0. Since at
pt = 1/2, profit from signal acquisition is positive when σ˜ = 0, it must also be positive
for other market maker’s beliefs σ˜ sufficiently close to 0 as Π (pt, σ˜) is continuous and
decreasing in σ˜ for any pt (see Lemma 3).
From the perspective of the market maker, when value traders acquire signals with high
probability, any buy or sell order has high informational content. Consequently, when σ˜
is high, the bid and ask spread is high as well. This suggests that, for any pt, the expected
profit from signal acquisition is decreasing in σ˜, the market maker’s belief regarding the
signal acquisition strategy of value traders.
Lemma 3. Π (pt, σ˜) is continuous in σ˜ and, for any pt ∈ (0, 1) , Π (pt, σ˜) is decreasing in σ˜.
From Lemma 3 it follows directly that p¯ (σ˜) is decreasing in σ˜ and p (σ˜) is increasing in σ˜.
Corollary 2. p¯ (σ˜) is decreasing in σ˜ and p (σ˜) is increasing in σ˜.
Let σt denote the signal acquisition strategy of value traders, i.e., σt is the probability with
which a value trader acquires information in period t. By definition, in equilibrium, the
belief of the market maker regarding the strategy of value traders must be correct, i.e.,
σ˜ = σt. Corollary 1 implies that, if Π (1/2, 1) > 0, when pt is sufficiently close to 1/2,
information players acquire signals with probability 1 and σ˜ = 1.
However, when the public belief crosses one of the thresholds p (1) or p¯ (1) , the expected
(net) payoff from signal acquisition Π (pt, 1) becomes negative. At this point, the mar-
ket maker needs to revise downwards his belief regarding the strategy of value traders.
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However, according to Lemma 3, as the probability that the market maker attaches to
signal acquisition goes down, the bid-ask spread decreases and, at the updated belief,
the payoff from signal acquisition becomes non-negative. This suggests that, for any
pt ∈
[
p (0) , p (1)
]
∪ [ p¯ (1) , p¯ (0)] , the market maker sets prices in such a way that in-
formation players are indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring signals.
Finally, when the public belief pt either crosses p (0) from above or crosses p¯ (0) from be-
low, signal acquisition becomes unprofitable for any belief of the market maker σ˜. Conse-
quently, value traders stop acquiring information and the market maker adjusts his belief
regarding the signal acquisition strategy accordingly.
The discussion above characterised the bid and ask prices as well as the optimal trad-
ing and signal acquisition strategies of traders for an arbitrary belief of the market maker
regarding the signal acquisition strategy of value traders. Proposition 1 combines these
characterisations with the requirement that in equilibrium, the market maker’s belief re-
garding the signal acquisition strategy should be correct to derive an equilibrium of the
model. In the proposition, asterisks denote equilibrium quantities.
Proposition 1. For any 0.5 < q ≤ 1 and 0 < c < (2q− 1) /2, there exists a non-empty set
of sequential trading games with costly information acquisition such that the following beliefs and
strategies constitute an equilibrium in those games:
(1) In every t, a value trader who has acquired a signal buys after observing S = 1 and sells after
observing S = 0, and a value trader who has not acquired a signal holds if A∗t > B∗t and behaves
in an arbitrary manner otherwise.
(2) A liquidity trader with valuation u buys if u ≥ A∗t , sells if u ≤ B∗t and holds otherwise.
(3) A value trader entering the market in period t acquires the signal with probability σ∗t such that,
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if Π (1/2, 1) > 0,
σ∗t =

1 if pt ∈
(
p (1) , p¯ (1)
)
ξt if pt ∈
[
p (0) , p (1)
]
∪ [ p¯ (1) , p¯ (0)]
0 if pt ∈
[
0, p (0)
)
∪ ( p¯ (0) , 1]
, (6)
and, if Π (1/2, 1) ≤ 0,
σ∗t =

ξt if pt ∈
[
p (0) , p¯ (0)
]
0 if pt ∈
[
0, p (0)
)
∪ ( p¯ (0) , 1]
, (7)
where ξt ∈ [0, 1] solves Π (pt, ξt) = 0.
(4) The market maker sets the lowest ask price and the highest bid prices that for σ∗t , solve equations
(3) and (4), respectively, i.e.:
A∗t =
1
2 (1− µ) [σ
∗
t µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) + (1− µ) (1+ pt)
−
(
(σ∗t µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) + (1− µ) (1+ pt))2
−4 (1− µ) (σ∗t µqpt + (1− µ) pt))1/2
]
(8)
and
B∗t =
1
2 (1− µ) [(1− µ) pt − σ
∗
t µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt))
+
(
(σ∗t µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt))− (1− µ) pt)2
+4σ∗t µ (1− µ) (1− q) pt)1/2
]
. (9)
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Proposition 1 and the preceding discussion indicate that information acquisition does not
stop abruptly. Instead, as the public belief regarding the asset value moves closer to the
extreme values of 0 or 1, the probability with which value traders acquire signals decreases
gradually and eventually falls to zero. Figure 2a illustrates the information acquisition
strategy for different values of pt assuming that at pt = 1/2, signals are acquired with
probability 1, i.e., Π (1/2, 1) > 0. When Π (1/2, 1) ≤ 0, the segment
[
p (1) , p¯ (1)
]
does
not exist, but otherwise the same figure describes signal acquisition strategy.
When µ ≥ µ¯ (q) , the game continues to have an equilibrium described in Proposition 1,
but in this equilibrium, the probability of acquiring the signal may not be monotonically
decreasing as pt moves towards the extreme values of 0 or 1. In particular, when µ ≥ µ¯ (q)
andΠ (1/2, 1) < 0, it could be the case that signals are acquired with probability less than
one for any pt ∈
(
p′ (1) , p¯′ (1)
)
, where p′ (1) > 1/2 > p¯′ (1) , with probability one for
any pt ∈
[
p (1) , p′ (1)
]
∪ [ p¯′ (1) , p¯ (1)], and then again with probability less than one for
any pt ∈
[
p (0) , p (1)
]
∪ [ p¯ (1) , p¯ (0)] (see Figure 2b).
For future reference, note that by solving Π (p, 0) = 0 for p, the following explicit expres-
sions for the belief thresholds p (0) and p¯ (0) at which traders stop acquiring information
can be obtained:
p (0) =
1
2
−
√
1
4
(
1− 2c
2q− 1
)
, (10)
p¯ (0) =
1
2
+
√
1
4
(
1− 2c
2q− 1
)
. (11)
It turns out that for every pt, there exists a unique mixed signal acquisition strategy of a
value trader such that the market maker has the correct belief regarding this strategy and
breaks even on every trade. This result can be anticipated from Lemma 3, which suggests
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(a) When µ < µ¯ (q) , the equilibrium signal acquisition strategy σ∗t is weakly
increasing in pt for pt ∈ [0, 1/2) and is weakly decreasing in pt for pt ∈ [1/2, 1] .
(b) When µ ≥ µ¯ (q) and Π (1/2, 1) < 0, the equilibrium signal acquisition strategy
σ∗t is non-monotone in pt for pt ∈ [0, 1/2) as well as for pt ∈ [1/2, 1] .
Figure 2: Information acquisition strategy σ∗t as a function of public belief pt.
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that in equilibrium, traders’ information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes.
According to this lemma for a given public belief pt, Π (pt, σ) is a decreasing function of
signal acquisition strategy σ and thus there could be at most one solution to Π (pt, σ) = 0.
The uniqueness of optimal signal acquisition strategy implies that the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 is essentially unique. There could be other equilibria which differ from
the one in Proposition 1 only in terms of prescribed trading behaviour for value traders
in the cases of indifference, i.e., when traders are indifferent between trading and play-
ing hold, or when they are indifferent between all actions in {buy, sell, hold} . However,
these tie-breaking conventions do not affect the qualitative features of the equilibrium.
Moreover, the behaviour of value traders when they are indifferent between all actions in
{buy, sell, hold} does not affect the determination of prices in any way.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium prices are unique subject to the tie-breaking rule that each value
trader places an order when indifferent between trading and not trading.7
In the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1, as the public belief moves closer to the ex-
treme values of 0 or 1, the probability with which value traders acquire signals decreases.
One consequence of this decline is a gradual narrowing of the bid and ask spread, A∗t − B∗t .
As the public belief moves closer to the extremes, the bid and ask spread also becomes nar-
rower in the model without costs to information acquisition. This is a basic property of
Bayesian updating. When there is little uncertainty about the asset value, signals cannot
have much effect on the posterior probability. However, while with costless information
the bid-ask spread disappears completely only when pt is either 0 or 1, in the model with
costly signals, the spread disappears away from the extremes. Thus the decrease in the
7The tie-breaking rule comes into play only when the bid-ask spread disappears and thus it cannot affect
the equilibrium dynamics of the game with a positive probability.
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probability with which signals are acquired accelerates the process of narrowing of the
bid and ask spread. Intuitively, when signals are acquired less frequently, each trade has
lower informational content. Hence the market maker can set bid and ask prices close to
the current public belief pt and still break even. In fact, from (15) and (16) it follows that
∂ (A∗t − B∗t ) /∂σ∗t > 0.
In the game, the public belief pt evolves so that, given a prior p1, for any t > 1
pt+1 =

A∗t if at = buy
pt if at = hold
B∗t if at = sell
, (12)
where A∗t and B∗t are defined in (8) and (9). When the public belief reaches either a value
(weakly) below p (0) or a value (weakly) above p¯ (0), the expected payoff from informa-
tion acquisition becomes (weakly) negative and information agents stop acquiring signals.
From this point onwards, trades no longer convey any information on the asset value, and
the bid-ask spread disappears. Moreover, once the belief reaches either a value weakly be-
low p (0) or a value weakly above p¯ (0), the market maker cannot make inferences from
the actions of traders and stops updating prices. Thus prices remain fixed at the same
level forever.
The result that information acquisition stops away from the extremes resembles the find-
ings of Burguet and Vives (2000), who find that with a positive marginal cost at zero
information acquisition, unbounded information accumulation is impossible in a smooth
and noisy social learning model.8 Here, a fixed cost to acquiring a signal plays the same
8In smooth and noisy social learning model of Burguet and Vives (2000), short-lived agents must predict
a random variable. Their predictions can be based either on private information or on public information.
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role as a positive cost at zero in Burguet and Vives (2000), and this cost causes information
acquisition to stop. The substantial difference is that Burguet and Vives (2000) is a social
learning (prediction) model, whereas the present model is an economy with prices acting
as signals.
3.2 Comparative Statics
The Effect of Cost to Information Acquisition on Equilibrium Behaviour
Section 3.1 has characterised the equilibrium for a fixed c. This section investigates how
equilibrium behavior and the amount of information accumulated by the market in equi-
librium change with the cost to signal acquisition.
Intuitively, a higher cost reduces incentives to acquire information for any public belief pt.
This intuition is formalised in the observation that the cost to signal acquisition is a shift
parameter in the expected payoff function Π (p, σ) : for any signal acquisition probability
σ, as c increases, Π (p, σ) shifts down in (p,Π) space. This implies that for any σ, p¯ (σ)
decreasing in c, while p (σ) is increasing in c.
Proposition 3. For any given signal acquisition probability σ,
∂
∂c
p¯ (σ) < 0 and
∂
∂c
p (σ) > 0.
Moreover,
lim
c→0
p¯ (σ) = 1 and lim
c→0
p (σ) = 0.
Public information is a noisy average of past predictions. The acquisition of private information is costly.
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From Proposition 3, taking σ = 0, it is clear that reducing c monotonically pushes out the
boundaries of the public belief region where value traders acquire information. Moreover,
as c → 0, p¯ (0) → 1 and p (0) → 0, and thus information acquisition never stops at the
limit as costs to information acquisition disappear. Finally, since, as c → 0, p¯ (σ) → 1
and p (σ) → 0 for all σ, at the limit the region where value traders use a non-degenerate
mixed signal acquisition strategy disappears. Thus, at the limit as c → 0, the equilib-
rium behaviour of value traders in the model with costly information coincides with the
behaviour of value traders in the model with no costs to information acquisition.
A higher cost of information acquisition reduces the informativeness of equilibrium in
the following sense. As c increases, in any given period t and for any public belief pt,
the equilibrium probability with which value traders acquire signals (weakly) decreases.9
This follows directly from the reduction in incentives to acquire information when it is
associated with higher costs.
Proposition 4. For any given public belief pt, the equilibrium signal acquisition strategy of value
traders, σ∗t , is weakly decreasing in c, i.e., for all pt ∈ [0, 1] , if c > c′,σ∗t (pt; c) ≤ σ∗t (pt; c′).
3.3 Long-run Behaviour of Prices and Informational Inefficiency
As is standard, also in the current setting, the public belief is a martingale with respect to
public information, as
E (pt+1 | Ht) = E (E (V | Ht+1) | Ht)
= E (V | Ht) = pt,
9The described reduction in information-acquisition probability affects the evolution of pt and thus has
dynamic consequences. Proposition 4 does not deal with these dynamic consequences.
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where the second equality follows by the Law of Iterated Expectations.10 Since the public
belief is a non-negative martingale, the conditions of the martingale convergence theorem
are satisfied and the sequence of prices {pt}∞t=1 converges to a random variable p∞ almost
surely.
When there are no costs associated with information acquisition, the public belief settles
almost surely at the liquidation value of the asset (see, for example, Avery and Zemsky
(1998) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). In a model with costly signals, however, conver-
gence to the true value of the asset is impossible and the public belief might even settle
“far away” from the true value. Proposition 5 demonstrates that in the case of costly sig-
nals, in the limit as time tends to infinity, the bid-ask spread disappears as in the case
where c = 0. This is just a consequence of the fact that the public belief is a uniformly
integrable martingale and thus, in addition to converging almost surely, it also converges
in L1.
Equilibrium characterisation in Section 3.1 indicates that, with costly signals, the bid-ask
spread disappears when the public belief crosses one of the thresholds p (0) or p¯ (0) (and
value traders no longer find it optimal to acquire additional information).11Consequently,
the fact that as t → ∞, the bid-ask spread disappears implies that in the long-run in-
formation acquisition information acquisition stops, i.e., the public belief converges to a
random variable p∞ taking values either “close to,” but weakly below p (0) , or “close to,”
but weakly above p¯ (0) .12 Since p (0) > 0 and p¯ (0) < 1, in equilibrium, the market price
10More formally, expectations should be conditioned on the σ-algebra generated by Ht.
11Due to Bayesian updating, the price moves in discrete steps. Thus in the long-run, the posterior belief
can overshoot either p (0) or p¯ (0), instead of landing at the threshold precisely. Consequently, the support
of random variable p∞ could be comprised of more than just two points.
12If the bid-ask spread did not disappear, the support of random variable p∞ would have been contained
in interval
(
p (0) , p¯ (0)
)
.
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(with with probability 1) gets stuck away from both 0 and 1, never converging to the true
value of the underlying asset even at the limit. Moreover, it is possible for transaction
prices to get trapped close to p (0) even when V = 1, or close to p¯ (0) even when V = 0.
Proposition 5. When c > 0, the sequence of public beliefs converges to a random variable p∞ that
takes values either close to, but weakly below p (0) or close to, but weakly above p¯ (0) .
Proposition 5 highlights the difference between the case of no costs to information acqui-
sition and the case of positive signal cost. When c = 0, the public belief converges to
the true value of the asset, while with arbitrarily small but positive c, public belief could
converge to a value far away from the liquidation value of the asset. Nevertheless, there
is no discontinuity in equilibrium at the limit as c → 0. Proposition 3 establishes that as c
tends to zero, thresholds p (0) and p¯ (0) at which information acquisition stops tend to 0
and 1 respectively and thus, at the limit as c → 0, market must learn the true value of the
asset. Proposition 6 and its Corollary 3 confirm that the approximate probability of price
getting trapped far away from the true value of the asset decreases as c decreases and, at
the limit as c→ 0, it is equal to zero.
For concreteness, Proposition 6 assumes that V = 0 and computes the probability
P (p∞ ≥ p¯ (0) | V = 0)
of the public belief converging to a value (weakly) above p¯ (0).13 This probability is com-
13This is without loss of generality as, given the symmetry of the environment, P
(
p∞ ≤ p (0) | V = 1
)
=
P (p∞ ≥ p¯ (0) | V = 0).
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puted using the fact that conditional on V = 0, the odds ratio
rt :=
pt
1− pt
is a bounded martingale with respect to public history Ht (see Lemma 4 in Appendix A)
and thus its unconditional expected value at t = 0 is equal to p1/ (1− p1). Moreover,
according to Proposition 5, as t → ∞, the public belief converges either to a value close
to, but weakly below, p (0) or to a value close to, but weakly above, p¯ (0) . This implies
that asymptotically the odds ratio is approximately equal either to p (0) /
(
1− p (0)
)
or
to p¯ (0) / (1− p¯ (0)).14 Equating the asymptotic expected value of the odds ratio to its
unconditional expected value allows deriving the approximate probability of the public
belief getting stuck far away from the underlying value of the asset as a function of p1,
p (0) , and p¯ (0) . Since p¯ (0) is decreasing, while p (0) is increasing in c (see Proposition 3),
its functional form implies that the approximate probability of public belief being trapped
far away from the true value is increasing in c.
Proposition 6. Suppose that 0 < c < (2q− 1) /2, V = 0 and p1 ∈
(
p (0) , p¯ (0)
)
. Then:
P (p∞ ≥ p¯ (0) | V = 0) =
(
p1 − p (0)
)
(1− p¯ (0))(
p¯ (0)− p (0)
)
(1− p1)
and is increasing in c.
Since as c tends to 0, p (0)→ 0 and p¯ (0)→ 1, it immediately follows that the approximate
probability of price getting trapped far away from the true value of the asset tends to 0 at
14The public belief converges to values close to, but not exactly equal to the thresholds p (0) and p¯ (0)
because, due to Bayesian updating, the price moves in discrete steps.
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the limit.
Corollary 3.
lim
c→0
P (p∞ ≥ p¯ (0) | V = 0) = 0
4 Welfare
The previous section characterised equilibrium in a decentralised market. This section
compares information acquisition efforts of decentralised-market participants to informa-
tion acquisition policy that a utilitarian social planner would wish to implement. The
interest of this question lies in the fact that, while there are no gains from trade between
the market maker and value traders, there are allocative gains to trade between the market
maker and liquidity traders. Hence, the informational inefficiency of prices identified in
Section 3.3 leads to allocative inefficiency in the long-run. However, because of the costs
of information acquisition, long-run allocative inefficiency does not immediately imply
that the total surplus is not maximized at the maket solution.
Consider a utilitarian social planner who does not have access to the private information
of traders, but can control the decisions to acquire this information through, e.g., the use of
taxes or subsidies. In period t when public belief regarding the asset value is pt and value
traders acquire signals with probability σ, the instantaneous social surplus is defined to
be:
S (pt, σ) = (1− µ)
(∫ 1
A∗t
(u− p) du +
∫ B∗t
0
(p− u) du
)
− µσc
= (1− µ)
(
(A∗t + B∗t − 1) pt −
1
2
(
A∗2t + B∗2t − 1
))
− µσc, (13)
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where B∗t and A∗t the bid and ask prices, respectively, defined in (9) and (8).
When information acquisition ceases and bid ask spread disappears, (13) reduces to:
S (p, 0) = (1− µ)
(
1
2
− p (1− p)
)
, (14)
which is maximised at p ∈ {0, 1} . This implies that in the long-run, allocative gains from
trade are maximised if market learns the true value of the asset. However, information
acquisition is costly and it also increases the bid-ask spread in the current period, which, in
turn, reduces the current-period allocative efficiency as liquidity traders with valuations
in [B∗t , A∗t ] do not trade. Thus, the social planner faces a trade-off between long-term gains
and short-term costs.
Suppose the planner discounts future at rate δ ∈ (0, 1) . The planner’s objective is to max-
imise the expected total surplus over the infinite horizon:
max
{σ0,σ1,...}
(1− δ)E
∞
∑
t=0
δtS (pt, σt) .
Discounting arises naturally in the model if in every trading period, a public announce-
ment that resolves uncertainty regarding the asset value (e.g., announcement of a merger
or earnings of a company) is expected to come with probability (1− δ) . Following such
release of public information, information-based trading ceases. Thus in the environment
with frequent news, the social planner is likely to display impatience, while in the en-
vironment where news is scarce, the social planner is likely to attach higher weight to
payoffs of future traders.
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Impatient social planner
Because the bid-ask spread precludes some liquidity traders from trading, an impatient
social planner with discount factor δ = 0 would prefer no information acquisition in
every period and for any pt. Thus, when there is significant uncertainty regarding the
asset value, at the decentralised market solution, there is overproduction of information
relative to the social optimum.
Proposition 7. Suppose equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists and in each t, social planner
solves:
max
σt
S (pt, σt) .
Then, market participants acquire too much information for any pt ∈
[
p (0) , p¯ (0)
]
relative the
social optimum.
Patient social planner
A very patient social planner cares mostly about the expected future payoffs of traders.
From (14), it follows that expected future welfare is maximized when the social planner
learns the true value of the asset. Consequently, regardless of the (fixed) belief p ∈ (0, 1),
terminating information acquisition is suboptimal for an infinitely patient social planner
(i.e., when δ→ 1).15
Proposition 8. For every period t and public belief pt ∈ (0, 1) , there exists a δ¯ (pt) ∈ (0, 1) such
that if the discount factor of the social planner exceeds δ¯ (pt) , σt = 0 is not socially optimal.
15This result is similar to the result in Bose et al. (2006), who study a dynamic pricing by a monopolist
selling to buyers who learn from each other’s purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract
rent from the current buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers.
Information increases future rent extraction, and thus an infinitely patient monopolist would never find it
optimal to stop providing buyers with some information and charge a pooling price.
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It immediately follows from Proposition 8 that a sufficiently patient social planner would
continue acquiring information beyond the signal-acquisition thresholds of the decen-
tralised market. This is because while deciding whether to acquire a signal, value traders
do not take into account the externality their decision exerts on the payoffs of future liq-
uidity traders.
Corollary 4. There exists a δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if the discount factor of the social planner exceeds
δ¯, he would find it optimal to continue acquiring information at public belief thresholds p (0) and
p¯ (0) , defined in (10) and (11), respectively.
Long-run information acquisition of the social planner
Since information acquisition is costly, when there is little uncertainty regarding the asset’s
value, the social planner finds it optimal to stop acquiring additional signals.
Proposition 9. For every discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) , there exist pS and p¯S, p¯S > 1/2 > pS, such
that it is socially optimal to acquire some information if and only if p ∈
[
pS, p¯S
]
.
Short-term behaviour
At one extreme, a very patient social planner is ready to endure the immediate cost to
information acquisition in order to improve future welfare. At the other extreme, a very
impatient social planner would rather prohibit information acquisition so as not to ex-
clude liquidity traders in the short-run. For a fixed discount factor δ, it is possible to con-
struct examples in which the social planner’s information acquisition interval
[
pS, p¯S
]
is
not wider than the market’s information acquisition interval
[
p (0) , p¯ (0)
]
. At the same
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(a) Value Functions (b) Policy Functions
Figure 3: Planner’s solution v. Market Equilibrium
time, it could be the case that for some part of the market’s information acquisition in-
terval
[
p (0) , p¯ (0)
]
, the social planner induces higher information acquisition effort than
that in the market equilibrium. This is because in the market equilibrium, the probabil-
ity with which value traders acquire signals declines gradually, while the social planner
either induces signal acquisition with probability 1 or prohibits it.
Figure 3 depicts an example where
[
p (1) , p¯ (1)
]
⊂
[
pS, p¯S
]
⊂
[
p (0) , p¯ (0)
]
and in[
pS, p (1)
]
∪ [ p¯ (1) , p¯S] the social planner induces higher information acquisition effort
than the signal acquisition probability in the unsubsidised market equilibrium. Panel (a)
depicts value functions associated with the market solution (blue dots) and the planner’s
problem (red dots); panel (b) depicts equilibrium signal acquisition probabilities (blue
line) and planner’s optimal policy function (red dashed line). The value functions are
generated through value function iteration (on 100 point grid) with the following param-
eters:16 δ = 0.94, q = .7, µ = 0.4 and c = 0.1.
16I thank Romans Pancs for providing the Mathematica algorithm for generating these graphs.
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5 Concluding Remarks
It has been demonstrated that, at the unique equilibrium of a sequential trade model with
costly information acquisition, value traders stop obtaining signals when the asset price
is sufficiently close to one of the extremes and the benefit of a signal is outweighed by its
cost. Thus there are two threshold values of the public belief about the likely asset value at
which signal acquisition stops. As a result, the price does not converge to the liquidation
value of the asset. Moreover, conditional on the true asset value, the probability of price
getting stuck far away from the liquidation value of the asset is strictly positive, indicating
that costs to information acquisition may bring about informational inefficiency thereby
prices do not reveal the value of the fundamental, even in the long-run.17
The paper also studies welfare implications of the termination of information acquisition.
In the proposed sequential trading model, liquidity traders value the asset differently
from the market maker and informed traders. Because of this difference in valuations,
there are allocative gains from trade and it matters whether the price approaches the liq-
uidation value of the asset in the long-run. However, value traders, when they decide
whether to acquire informative signals, do not take into account the positive externality
their decisions exert on the welfare of liquidity traders. This implies that, when the so-
cial discount factor is sufficiently high, the decentralised market solution underprovides
information relative to a social optimum. At the same time, if the social discount factor is
low, market overprovides information as signal acquisition efforts induce a positive bid-
ask spread, which in turn, prices some of the liquidity traders out of the market in the
short-run.
17It can be demonstrated that qualitatively similar results prevail in a more general setting where value
traders can choose the precision of the signal to acquire.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows by Proposition 1 in Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix 1 > q > 1/2. After some algebraΠ (pt, σ˜) can be written as follows:
Π (pt, σ˜) = (2q− 1) pt − (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) At (σ˜) + ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt)) Bt (σ˜)− c.
Taking the derivative with respect to pt and evaluating the limit as µ→ 0 :
lim
µ→0
dΠ
dpt
= 2 (2q− 1) (1− 2p)

> 0 if p < 1/2
= 0 if p = 1/2
< 0 if p > 1/2
.
Note that At (σ˜) and Bt (σ˜) are continuous functions of µand thus Π (pt, σ˜) is continuous
in µ. Consequently, for sufficiently small µ, Π (pt, σ˜) is increasing in pt for pt ≤ 1/2 and is
decreasing in pt for pt ≥ 1/2, reaching maximum at pt = 1/2.
Proof of Corollary 1: By Lemma 2 any σ˜, pt = 1/2 is a unique point at which Π (pt, σ˜)
reaches the maximum. Note that
Π (1/2, 0) = q− 1
2
− c > 0,
by hypothesis of the lemma. Since by Lemma 3 Π (1/2, σ˜) is continuous and decreasing
in σ˜, there must exist some σ¯ ∈ (0, 1] such that Π (1/2, σ˜) ≥ 0 if and only if σ˜ ≤ σ¯. If
Π (1/2, 1) > 0, let σ¯ = 1; otherwise define σ¯ as a solution to Π (1/2, σ¯) = 0.
Consider σ˜ ≤ σ¯. Note that for any such σ˜, Π (1, σ˜) = Π (0, σ˜) = −c and Π (1/2, σ˜) ≥
0. Since for pt ∈ [0, 1/2] , Π (pt, σ˜) is continuous and strictly increasing function of pt,
by intermediate-value theorem, there exists p (σ˜) ∈ [0, 1/2] such that Π (pt, σ˜) < 0 for
all pt ∈
[
0, p (σ˜)
)
and Π (pt, σ˜) ≥ 0 for all pt ∈
[
p (σ˜) , 1/2
]
. Similarly, since for pt ∈
[1/2, 1] , Π (pt, σ˜) is continuous and strictly decreasing function of pt, by intermediate-
value theorem, there exists p¯ (σ˜) ∈ [1/2, 1] such that Π (pt, σ˜) < 0 for all pt ∈ ( p¯ (σ˜) , 1]
and Π (pt, σ˜) ≥ 0 for all pt ∈ [1/2, p¯ (σ˜)] .
Proof of Lemma 3: The fact that Π (pt, σ˜) is continuous in σ˜ follows directly from the
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expression (5).
∂
∂σ˜
Π (pt, σ˜) = − (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) ∂At
∂σ˜
+ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt)) ∂Bt
∂σ˜
,
where, for any pt ∈ (0, 1) ,
∂At
∂σ˜
=
1
2 (1− µ)
×
 2 (1− µ) µqpt√
(σ˜µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) + (1− µ) (1+ pt))2 − 4 (1− µ) (σ˜µqpt + (1− µ) pt)
+µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt))× (1−
σ˜µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) + (1− µ) (1+ pt)√
(σ˜µ (qpt + (1− q) (1− pt)) + (1− µ) (1+ pt))2 − 4 (1− µ) (σ˜µqpt + (1− µ) pt)

> 0 (15)
and
∂Bt
∂σ˜
=
1
2 (1− µ)
×
 2µ (1− µ) (1− q) pt√
(σ˜µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt))− (1− µ) pt)2 + 4σ˜µ (1− µ) (1− q) pt
+µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt))
×
 σ˜µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt))− (1− µ) pt√
(σ˜µ ((1− q) pt + q (1− pt))− (1− µ) pt)2 + 4σ˜µ (1− µ) (1− q) pt
− 1

< 0 (16)
Since ∂At/∂σ˜ > 0 and ∂Bt/∂σ˜ < 0 for every σ˜ and every pt ∈ (0, 1) , ∂Π (pt, σ˜) /∂σ˜ < 0
for every pt ∈ (0, 1) as required.
Proof of Proposition 1: The specified trading strategy maximises the payoff of liquidity
34
traders. Consider the specified trading strategy of value traders. For any pt ∈ [0, 1] and
any σ∗t ∈ [0, 1] ,
E [V | S = 1, Ht] ≥ A∗t ≥ pt ≥ B∗t ≥ E [V | S = 0, Ht] ,
where A∗t and B∗t are defined in (8) and (9) respectively andE [V | S = 1, Ht] andE [V | S = 0, Ht]
are given in (1) and (2) respectively. Thus the expected payoff of an informed trader who
has observed S = 1 is weakly greater when he buys than when he sells:
Epi (buy, A∗t , B∗t ) = E [V | S = 1, Ht]− A∗t − c ≥ −c
≥ B∗t −E [V | S = 1, Ht]− c = Epi (sell, A∗t , B∗t ) .
Hence it is optimal to buy after observing S = 1. Similarly, the expected payoff of an
informed trader who has observed S = 0 is weakly greater when he sells than when he
buys:
Epi (buy, A∗t , B∗t ) = E [V | S = 0, Ht]− A∗t − c ≤ −c
≤ B∗t −E [V | S = 1, Ht]− c = Epi (sell, A∗t , B∗t ) .
Hence it is optimal to sell after observing S = 0.
Given that a value trader entering the market in period t acquires a signal with probability
σ∗t , A∗t , which is defined in (8), is equal to E [V | at = buy at A∗t , Ht] and B∗t , which is
defined in (9), is equal to E [V | at = sell at B∗t , Ht]. Hence the market maker breaks even
on every trade.
The expected payoff from abstaining from signal acquisition is 0 for any pt ∈ [0, 1] . This is
because A∗t ≥ pt ≥ B∗t and thus an uniformed value trader either holds, when A∗t > pt >
B∗t , or trades at a price equal to his assessment of the asset value, when A∗t = pt = B∗t .
In either case, an uniformed value trader earns an expected payoff of 0. Given A∗t and
B∗t defined in (8) and (9) respectively, for any pt ∈
(
p (1) , p¯ (1)
)
, the expected payoff
from signal acquisition is strictly positive by Corollary 1. Hence, in this range of pt, it is
optimal to acquire a signal with probability 1. For any pt ∈
[
p (0) , p (1)
]
∪ [ p¯ (1) , p¯ (0)] ,
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the expected payoff from signal acquisition is 0 by construction.18 Hence a value trader
is indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring the signal and acquiring a signal with
probability ξt constitutes an optimal behaviour. Finally, for any pt ∈
[
0, p (0)
)
∪ ( p¯ (0) , 1] ,
the expected payoff from signal acquisition is negative by Lemma 1. Hence, in this range
of pt, it is optimal not to acquire a signal.
It follows that, after every history, liquidity and value traders do not have profitable de-
viations and the market maker breaks even and has the correct belief regarding the signal
acquisition strategy of value traders. Hence the proposed prices and strategy for informa-
tion and liquidity traders constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose in period t there exist two equilibrium ask prices: A∗t and
Aˆ∗t such that A∗t < Aˆ∗t . Given the market maker’s belief regarding the signal acquisition
strategy of value traders, the ask price is uniquely determined by the lowest solution to
A = E [V | at = buy at A, Ht] . In equilibrium, the belief of the market maker is correct
and equal to the probability with which a value trader acquires a signal in period t. Hence
the difference between A∗t and Aˆ∗t could stem only from non-uniqueness of the optimal
signal acquisition strategy of a value trader entering the market in period t.
Let σˆt and σ∗t be the probability with which a value trader entering the market in period
t acquires a signal in an equilibrium with an ask price of Aˆ∗t and in an equilibrium with
an ask price of A∗t respectively. A∗t < Aˆ∗t implies that σˆt > σ∗t ≥ 0 by 15. Suppose that
Π (1/2, 1) ≥ 1. When pt ∈
(
p (1) , p¯ (1)
)
, by Lemma 1, the expected payoff from signal
acquisition is strictly positive irrespective of the belief of the market maker. Hence in this
range of pt, it is optimal for a value trader to acquire a signal with probability 1 and it
is impossible to have σˆt and σ∗t such that σˆt 6= σ∗t and both of which are consistent with
equilibrium behaviour. Similarly, when pt ∈
[
0, p (0)
)
∪ ( p¯ (0) , 1] , by Corollary 1 the ex-
pected payoff from signal acquisition is strictly negative irrespective of the belief of the
market maker. Hence, in this range of pt, it is optimal for a value trader not to acquire
a signal and both σˆt and σ∗t , where σˆt 6= σ∗t , cannot be consistent with equilibrium be-
haviour. Finally, suppose that pt ∈
[
p (0) , p (1)
]
∪ [ p¯ (1) , p¯ (0)] . If Π (pt, σ∗t ) = 0 then, by
18If at pt = 1/2, it is profitable to acquire signal and Π (pt, 1) ≥ 0, by Corollary 2 p (0) < p (1) , p¯ (1) <
p¯ (0) and intervals
[
p (0) , p (1)
]
and [ p¯ (1) , p¯ (0)] are non-empty. If Π (pt, 1) < 0, interval
[
p (0) , p¯ (0)
]
is
non-empty by Corollary 1.
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Lemma 3, Π (pt, σˆt) < 0. Thus at ask price Aˆ∗t , value traders find it optimal not to acquire
a signal and σˆt = 0, which contradicts the assumption that σˆt > σ∗t ≥ 0. If Π (pt, σˆt) = 0
then, by Lemma 3, Π (pt, σ∗t ) > 0. Thus at ask price Aˆ∗t , value traders acquire a signal
with probability 1 and σ∗t = 1, which contradicts the assumption that σˆt > σ∗t . Similar
arguments show that ask price is unique also if Π (1/2, 1) ≤ 0 < Π (1/2, 0) .
The uniqueness of the bid price can be proved in a similar manner.
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that (1) c shifts Π (p, σ) up and down in (p,Π) space; (2)
for any σ, viewed as a function of p, Π (p, σ) has finite slope for any p, and (3) Π (p, σ) is
strictly increasing for p < 1/2 and is strictly decreasing for p > 1/2. Hence, it follows that
∂
∂c
p¯ (σ) < 0 and
∂
∂c
p (σ) > 0.
Moreover,
lim
c→0
Π (0, σ) = lim
c→0
Π (1, σ) = 0.
Since for any given σ,Π (0, σ) = Π (1, σ) constitutes the minimum ofΠ (p, σ) as a function
of p, it follows that for any p and any σ, limc→0Π (p, σ) ≥ 0. Consequently,
lim
c→0
p¯ (σ) = 1 and lim
c→0
p (σ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: Fix pt and consider c > c′, so that any σ, Π (pt, σ; c) lies below
Π (pt, σ; c′) in (p,Π) space. Let σ = σ∗t (pt; c′) . There are three possibilities to consider:
1. Π (pt, σ; c′) > 0 and Π (pt, σ; c) > 0. In this case, σ∗t (pt; c′) = σ∗t (pt; c) = 1.
2. Π (pt, σ; c′) < 0 and Π (pt, σ; c) < 0. In this case, σ∗t (pt; c′) = σ∗t (pt; c) = 0.
3. Π (pt, σ; c′) ≥ 0 and Π (pt, σ; c) ≤ 0. In this case, σ∗t (pt; c) ≤ σ∗t (pt; c′) ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let c > 0. Since
E (pt+1 | Ht) = E (E (V | Ht+1) | Ht)
= E (V | Ht) = pt,
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the belief process {pt}∞t=1 is a non-negative martingale with respect to public history Ht
and, by the Martingale Converge Theorem, as t→ ∞, it converges almost surely to a finite
limit p∞. Moreover, since for every t, pt ≤ 1, {pt}∞t=1 is uniformly integrable and thus it
also converges in L1, i.e.,
E |pt − p∞| → 0.
Note that by the Minkowski inequality,
E |pt+1 − pt| = E |pt+1 − p∞ + p∞ − pt|
≤ E |pt+1 − p∞|+E |p∞ − pt| .
This combined with L1 convergence implies that, as t→ ∞,
E |pt+1 − pt| → 0,
where
E |pt+1 − pt| = E (E (|pt+1 − pt| | Ht))
= E (P (at = buy | Ht) |A∗t − pt|+P (at = sell | Ht) |B∗t − pt|)
It follows that, as t → ∞, both |A∗t − pt| → 0 and |B∗t − pt| → 0. Hence, asymptotically
the bid-and-ask spread disappears and {pt}∞t=1 converges almost surely to p∞ that takes
values either close to, but weakly below p (0) or close to, but weakly above p¯ (0) .
The proof of Proposition 6 makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Conditional on V = 0, the odds ratio rt, defined as
rt :=
pt
1− pt ,
is a martingale.
Proof. If p1 ∈
[
0, p (0)
]
∪ [ p¯ (0) , 1] , pt = p1 in every period t, the proposition trivially
follows. Hence assume that p1 ∈
(
p (0) , p¯ (0)
)
.
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Let Pˆ be the probability measure on the space of outcomes {0, 1}× ({buy, sell, hold} × [0, 1])∞
induced by the prior belief p1, random order of trader arrival and the equilibrium strategy
profile, conditional on V = 0.
Under the probability measure Pˆ, {rt}∞t=1 is a martingale because
Eˆ
(
pt+1
1− pt+1 | Ht
)
= Pˆ (at = buy | Ht) A
∗
t
1− A∗t
+Pˆ (at = hold | Ht) pt1− pt
+Pˆ (at = sell | Ht) B
∗
t
1− B∗t
= (σ∗t µ (1− q) + (1− A∗t ) (1− µ))
σ∗t qµ+ (1− A∗t ) (1− µ)
σ∗t µ (1− q) + (1− A∗t ) (1− µ)
pt
1− pt
+ ((1− σ∗t ) µ+ (A∗t − B∗t ) (1− µ))
pt
1− pt
+ (σ∗t µq + B∗t (1− µ))
σ∗t (1− q) µ+ B∗t (1− µ)
σ∗t µq + B∗t (1− µ)
pt
1− pt
=
pt
1− pt .
Proof of Proposition 6: Let T be the time when the belief process reaches either p¯ (0) or
p (0), i.e.,
T = min
{
Tp¯, Tp
}
,
where
Tp¯ = inf {t ≥ 1 : pt ≥ p¯ (0)}
and
Tp = inf
{
t ≥ 1 : pt ≤ p (0)
}
.
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Let Pˆ be the probability measure on the space of outcomes {0, 1}× ({buy, sell, hold} × [0, 1])∞
induced by the prior belief p1, random order of trader arrival and the equilibrium strat-
egy profile, conditional on V = 0. Denote by Eˆ (·) expectations taken with respect to this
measure. With this notation,
P (p∞ ≥ p¯ (0) | V = 0) = Pˆ
(
T = Tp¯
)
.
Since on the equilibrium path, for every t, rt is bounded above by p¯ (0) / (1− p¯ (0)) < ∞,
by Lemma 4 {rt}∞t=1 is a uniformly integrable martingale. It follows that the Optional
Sampling Theorem applies and the odds ratio process stopped at T is also a martingale
and Eˆ (rT | Ht) = rt for every t ≤ T. Thus Eˆ (rT) = r1. Since at T, rT ' p¯ (0) / (1− p¯ (0))
or rT ' p (0) /
(
1− p (0)
)
,
Eˆ (rT) '
(
1− Pˆ (T = Tp¯)) p (0)1− p (0) + Pˆ (T = Tp¯) p¯ (0)1− p¯ (0)
=
p1
1− p1 .
Rearranging the expression above, the desired expression is obtained:
Pˆ
(
T = Tp¯
) '
(
p1 − p (0)
)
(1− p¯ (0))(
p¯ (0)− p (0)
)
(1− p1)
.
Taking the derivative:
∂
∂c
Pˆ
(
T = Tp¯
)
= −
( p¯ (0)− p1) (1− p¯ (0)) ∂p(0)∂c +
(
p1 − p (0)
) (
1− p (0)
)
∂ p¯(0)
∂c
(1− p1)
(
p¯ (0)− p (0)
)2 .
Note that the expressions for p (0) and p¯ (0) are obtained in (10) and (11), respectively, by
solving Π (p, 0) = 0 for p. Thus:
p¯ (0) = 1− p (0)
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and
∂p (0)
∂c
= −∂ p¯ (0)
∂c
=
2c
2q− 1
(
1− 2c
2q− 1
)−1/2
> 0.
The expression of the derivative of Pˆ
(
T = Tp¯
)
with respect to c simplifies to:
∂
∂c
Pˆ
(
T = Tp¯
)
=
(
p1 − p (0)
)2
(1− p1)
(
1− 2p (0)
)2 ∂p (0)∂c > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7: Taking the derivative w.r.t. σ of the social surplus defined in (13):
∂S
∂σ
= (1− µ)
(
(pt − B∗t )
∂B∗t
∂σ
− (A∗t − pt)
∂A∗t
∂σ
)
− µc < 0,
where the inequality follows as pt − B∗t ≥ 0, ∂B∗t /∂σ < 0 from (16), A∗t − pt ≥ 0 and
∂A∗t /∂σ > 0 from (15). Thus, the per-period social surplus is decreasing in information
acquisition efforts and it is optimal to set σ = 0 in every t.
Proof of Proposition 8: Consider two alternative strategies a social planner could pursue:
1. The social planner sets σt = σ > 0 and στ = 0 in every period τ = t + 1, t + 2, ... .
2. The social planner sets στ = 0 in the current period t and in every period thereafter.
The difference in payoffs from the two strategies is:
(1− δ) [S (pt, σ)− S (pt, 0)] + δ [ES (pt+1, 0)− S (pt, 0)] .
The first term in square brackets is finite and independent of δ. The term in the second
square brackets is positive:
ES (pt+1, 0) ≥ S (Ept+1, 0) = S (pt, 0) ,
where the inequality follows by Jensen’s inequality as S (p, 0) is convex in p and the equal-
ity follows as the belief process {pτ}∞τ=t is a martingale. Consequently for large enough δ,
the first strategy yields higher payoff than the second strategy.
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Proof of Proposition 9: Suppose the current public belief regarding the asset value is p
and consider two alternative strategies for the social planner:
1. The social planner sets σ > 0 in the current period and σ = 0 in every subsequent
period.
2. The social planner ceases to acquire information immediately.
Since for any p, S (p, 0) ≤ (1− µ) /2, the continuation payoff from the first policy is
bounded above by:
δ (1− µ) 1
2
.
The payoff from the second strategy is
(1− δ)
∞
∑
t=0
δtS (p, 0) = (1− δ) S (p, 0) + δ (1− µ)
(
1
2
− p (1− p)
)
by (14). It follows that the difference in payoffs between the two policies is bounded above
by:
(1− δ) [S (p, σ)− S (p, 0)] + δ (1− µ) p (1− p) .
Since as p→ 0 or 1, the bid and the ask prices tend to p, it follows that:
lim
p→{0,1}
(1− δ) [S (p, σ)− S (p, 0)] + δ (1− µ) p (1− p) = − (1− δ) cσµ < 0.
Consequently only σ = 0 maximises social welfare when p is sufficiently close to 0 or 1.
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